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INTRODUCTION-U.S./JAPANESE TRADE: ITS SCOPE
AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK
DAN FENNO HENDERSON*
For the past several years, the United States has had more trade
with Japan than with any other country in the world, except Canada.
Furthermore, the state of Washington has had the highest per capita
exports to Japan of any of the states, due largely to wheat, logs, and
jet aircraft. Besides its obvious benefits, growing trade interdepen-
dence has caused its own frictions which have, in turn, required
intervention by the American and Japanese governments. This has
produced treaties as well as national legal regulation in both Japan
and the United States to supplement the private law of sales. Some-
thing of the scope and trends of U.S./Japanese trade, as well as the
Japanese regulatory devices and the international legal framework,
is presented below.
I. SCOPE AND COMPARISON OF U.S./JAPANESE FOREIGN TRADE
In 1965, the United States, with a population double that of Japan,
had a total import-export trade which tripled Japan's overall trade.
TABLE I-U.S. AND JAPAN TRADE IN 19651
Popula- Per Capita Total
tion GNP Income Export Import Trade
U.S. 195 million $676 billion $2500 $27.3 billion $21.4 billion $48.7 billion
Japan 98 " 78 " 633 8.4* " 8.2 " 16.6
* 1966 Japan exports were $9.8 billion
As the figures show, Japan is much more dependent on its foreign trade
than is the United States, for trade is about 21% of Japan's gross
national product (GNP) as opposed to 7% for the United States.
This fact becomes even clearer if it is remembered that Japan is the
world's leading shipbuilder and third largest producer of crude iron
* Director, Asian Law Program, University of Washington. B.A., 1944, Whitman
College; B.A., 1945, Michigan; LL.B., 1949, Harvard; Ph.D., 1955, California
(Berkeley).
'United States statistics from U.S. BUREAU OF CENSUS, DE'T OF COMERcE,
STATISTICAL ABSTRACTS OF THE U.S. 868 (1966); Japanese statistics from JAPAN
EcoNomIc YEARBOOK 70 (Oriental Economist 1966) [hereinafter cited YEARBOOK].
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and steel (after the United States and Russia), while importing 92 %
of its iron ore and 17% of its coking coal. Japan, a leading textile
and auto producer, also imports 100% of its raw cotton, wool, crude
rubber, phosphate ore, and bauxite and 99 % of its crude oil. 2 For the
fifth largest industrial complex in the free world (after the United
States, West Germany, Britain, and France), this is a remarkable
dependence, for the most basic raw materials, on world markets usually
thousands of miles away.
Furthermore, Japan is not only highly dependent on foreign raw
materials generally; its trade is also remarkably focused on the United
States.
TABLE II-JAPANEsE TRADING PARTNERS IN 19653
Import Export
U.S. 29.0% U.S. 29.3%
Australia 6.8 Liberia 4.4
Canada 4.4 Australia 3.7
Philippines 3.1 Hong Kong 3.4
Iran 3.0 Communist
China 2.9
U.S.S.R. 2.9 Thailand 2.6
Saudia Arabia 2.8 Formosa 2.6
Communist China 2.8 Canada 2.5
West Germany 2.7 Vest Germany 2.5
England 2.0 England 2.4
TABLE III-IMAJOR REGIONAL BREAKDOWN OF JAPANESE TRADE IN 19654
Imports Exports




South America 4.8 2.9
Africa 4.3 9.7
Commodity breakdowns for Japanese imports in 1965 show that
imports were predominantly agricultural, fuel, and raw materials (plus
- See Ohara, Legal Aspects of Japan's Foreign Trade, 1 J. WORLD TRADE L. 1(1967).3YEARBooic at 70.
'Ibid.
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heavy industrial equipment), and Japanese exports have been pre-
dominantly light manufactured products.









Metallic Ores & Scraps . . .
Iron ores ..........
Steel scraps .........
Non-ferrous metal ores . .
Other Raw Materials . . .
Rayon pulp .........





Talw . . . . . . .
Phosphate rocks ....
Salt . . . . . . . .
Mineral Fuels .........
Coal . . . . . . . .
Petroleum ......
Chemical Products ....
Potassium fertilizer . . .
Machinery .. ........
Business Machines . . .
Metal processing machinery
Passenger automobiles . .
Others . . . . . . . .










































































TABLE V-JAPANESE EXPORTS BY COMMODITY IN 19650
Value
(in millions) 7'% of total
Foods & Drinks ........ .$ 344 4.1
Fish & Shellfish ...... . 231 2.7
Tea ... ........... . 3 0.04
Fibers and Products ........ . 1,582 18.7
Raw Silk ........... .. 14 0.2
Woolen Yarn ........ .. 38 0.4
Cotton Yarn .......... . 20 0.2
Rayon Yarn .......... . 22 0.3
Synthetic Fiber Textiles .... 186 2.2
Woolen Textiles ...... . 87 1.0
Cotton Textiles ....... ... 303 3.6
Silk Textiles ....... 36 0.4
Rayon Textiles ....... . 68 0.8
Spun Rayon Textiles ....... 90 1.1
Garments .. ........ 287 3.4
Chemicals . ......... . 547 6.5
Chemical Fertilizers ..... .. 87 1.0
Non-Metallic Minerals ..... . 265 3.1
Cement . ......... . 21 0.2
Ceramics ........... . 84 1.0
Metals & Products ... ...... 1,718 20.3
Metal Products ....... ... 305 3.6
Iron & Steel .......... ... 1,290 15.3
Non-ferrous Metals ..... . 123 1.5
Machinery .. ......... .. 2,643 31.3
Textile Machinery & Parts. 82 1.0
Sewing Machinery ..... 72 0.9
Radio Receivers ...... . 216 2.6
Ships .. .......... .. 713 8.4
Railway Rolling Stock .... 41 0.5
Automobiles .......... .. 237 2.8
Others ... .......... 1,357 16.1
Lumber .......... . 24 0.3
Plywood ........... . 65 0.8
Optical Instruments & Parts 179 2.1
Cameras .......... . 53 0.6
Toys .. .......... . 98 1.2
Total ... ........... .. 8,452 100.0
'YEARBOOK at 67.
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Turning specifically to U.S./Japanese trade, Tables VI and VII
show exports and imports by commodities.
TABLE VI-CoMPOSITION OF U.S. EXPORTS TO JAPAN IN 1965"
(Percentage Distribution of Major Categories)
Total 100.0
Food & Live Animals ... ........... 23.4%
Beverages & Tobacco ... .......... .. 1.8
Crude Materials, Inedible
(Ex. Fuels) ..... ............ .. 30.9
Mineral Fuels, Lubricants
& Related Materials ... .......... . 6.7
Animal & Vegetable Oils & Fats ....... . 1.8
Chemicals ..... .............. .. 7.3
Manufactured Goods
Classified by Material .. ......... ... 3.3
Machinery & Transport
Equipment ..... ............. .. 20.4
Miscellaneous Manufactured
Goods ..... .............. .. 4.2
Other ...... ............... .. 0.2
TABLE VII-COMPOSITION OF U.S. IMPORTS FROM JAPAN IN 19658
(Percentage Distribution of Major Categories)
Total 100.0
Food & Live Animals ....
Crude Materials, Inedible
(Ex. Fuels) .. ......
Animal & Vegetable Oils & Fats
Chemicals ... .........
Manufactured Goods Classified





Other . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . 3.7%
. . . . . . 2.1
. . . . . . 0.2
. . . . . . 1.9
. . . . . . 44.7
. . . . . . 23.2
. . . . . . 22.1
. . . . . . 2.1
" U.S./JAPAN TRADE COuNcIL, U.S. TRADE BALANCE WITH JAPAN 5 (1966). For
more details on 1965 exports, see U.S. BuIaEAu OF INT'L COMMERCE, DEPT' OF
COMMERCE, OVERSEAS BUSINESS REPORTS 4 (Sept. 1966).
'U.S./JAPAN TRADE CouNcIL, op. cit. smpra note 7, at 5.
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Of all the states, Washington has the highest per capita trade through
its ports to and from Japan.












New York 5 18
The commodity breakdown of Japanese trade
ports is as follows:
through Washington
TABLE IX





GRAND TOTAL 141,052 77,034 83.1
Food & Live Animals 36,880 20,331 81.4
Fish & fish preparations. 1,563 970 61.1
Wheat, unmilled ... . 26,109 16,418 59.0
Barley, unmilled . ... 157 696 -77.4
Corn, unmilled ....... .. 5,271 2 *
Feeding-stuff for animals 2,791 829 236.7
Other foods & feeds . 989 1,416 -30.2
Crude Materials . ..... . 49,885 39,931 24.9
Hides & skins, undressed. 2,363 1,473 60.4
Logs . ........ 37,817 25,312 49.4
Pulp & waste paper . 6,794 7,190 - 5.5
Iron & steel scrap . ... 1,207 1,242 - 2.8
Non-ferrous metal scrap . 1,345 3,592 -62.6
Other crude materials . 359 1,122 -69.0
9Based on the writer's calculations using standard population figures for 1963 and
data reported in U.S./JAPA" TRADE COUNCIL, JAPAN Buys A-EmICAN IN ALL FIFTY
STATES (1965).
"These figures are derived from U.S. BUREAU OF CENsus, DEP'T OF COmmERcE,
FOREIGN TRADE REP'T EA-663 (1964-1965).
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TABLE IX (continued)
Inedible Tallow ..... . 906 1,436 -36.9
Chemicals . ....... . 1,010 1,156 -12.6
Manufactured Goods . ... 14,124 12,370 14.2
Copper, refined ..... ... 12,220 9,656 26.5
Aluminum . ...... . 1,165 809 44.0
Other manufactured goods 739 1,905 -61.2
Machinery & Transport
Equipment . ...... .. 37,974 1,773
Non-electrical machinery 1,255 1,587 -20.9
Electrical machinery &
apparatus ..... 2,555 156
Telecommunications
apparatus . .... . 1,995 4 *
Transport equipment . . . 34,168 32 *
Aircraft . ...... 33,425 7 *
Miscellaneous Goods . ... 273 -37 637.8
Percentage increases too large to be meaningful.
TABLE X





GRAND TOTAL 59,499 44,942 32.4
Food Products ........ . 6,531 7,204 - 9.3
Fish & fish preparations . 4,484 5,042 -11.1
Tuna, preserved . ... 2,805 3,536 -20.7
Mandarin oranges, canned 1,785 1,927 - 7.4
Other food products . 262 235 11.5
Lumber . ........ . 419 942 -55.5
(Philippine mahogany) (312) (842) -62.9
Chemicals ....... . 502 672 -25.3
Manufactured Goods . ... 39,525 30,737 28.6
UThese figures are derived from U.S. BUREAU OF CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE,




Veneers, plywood boards, etc. 3,851 2,848 35.2
(Philippine mahogany
plywood) ..... ... (1,473) (1,067) 38.1
(Birch plywood) . (1,444) (826) 74.8
Pearls & precious stones 11,453 9,502 20.5
Iron & steel ... ...... 12,304 8,653 42.2
Universals, plates & sheets 9,218 6,210 48.4
Wire, except wire rod. 902 879 2.6
Tubes, pipes & fittings. 1,274 1,262 1.0
Toys, games & sporting
goods . ....... .. 1,613 1,406 14.7
Other manufactured goods . 10,304 8,328 23.7
Machinery & Transport
Equipment . ...... . 7,726 4,604 67.8
Non-electrical machinery 2,305 2,168 6.3
Passenger automobiles, new. 1,120 640 75.0
Other machinery and transport
equipment ........ . 4,301 1,796 139.5
Miscellaneous Goods . ... 4,796 783 512.5
Three further trends are important to the overall understanding
of U.S./Japanese trade. First, it has been growing rapidly. Japanese
overall imports, for example, have more than tripled ($2.4 to $8.2
billion) in the past decade, with the United States portion of Japanese
trade remaining level at roughly 30%. Overall, Japan's share of total
world trade has increased from 2% to 5% since 1954 at an annual
rate of 15% (e.g., 27.6% in 1964; 21.4% in 1965; 14.4% in 1966).
This is even substantially larger than the impressive 9.3% average
annual increase in the Japanese GNP over the past ten years. Second,
the shift recently in Japanese exports from light to heavy industrial
(including chemical) products is noticeable. This means that Japan
may commence to compete more with American heavy industry of
which it has heretofore been a major customer, purchasing both pro-
ducts and technology. No doubt adjustments must be made to accom-
modate Japan's shift into heavier manufacturing, including automo-
biles. Third, in 1965 for the first time Japan had a favorable trade
balance ($359 million) with the United States, and this trend con-
[ VOL. 42: 333
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tinued in 1966. Whether the Vietnam War is the cause and therefore
whether the favorable balance will survive the war are difficult ques-
tions to answer now.
II. JAPANESE LEGAL CONTROLS ON TRADE
While vigorously seeking to expand its exports since 1949, the
Japanese Government has maintained strict controls over the terms
for export transactions and restrictions on competitive imports12(i.e.,
mostly manufactured items) until very recently. The licensing of
exports by Japanese officialdom has been used to require payment
in approved currencies, usually cash on delivery of the goods. Tech-
nically, these rules are known as "standard methods of settlement,"
which usually means C.I.F. or F.O.B. Yokohama with an irrevocable
letter of credit arranged so that payment can be exchanged in Japan
against shipping documents.' 3 Additionally, these regulations have been
used to impose a so-called "check price" on certain products. The check
price sets a minimum below which Japanese exporters are not allowed
to sell to foreign buyers. If they go below the check price, the officials
will not grant an export license. However, check prices are embodied
only in informal rules (naiki) with little basis in law. In fact, the
Tokyo District Court has declared the check price on transistor radios
illegal, and refused to enforce it in favor of one Japanese seller, who
had pleaded the check price in defense to a claim for damages
measured by the difference between the check price and the contract
price.14 Nevertheless, large quantities of certain goods had already
apparently moved between Japan and the United States at less than
the check prices by the technique of refunding in yen currency part
of the letter of credit price to the foreign buyer's agent in Japan.
Another purpose of Japanese export controls has been to prevent
"The major regulations are: Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control
Act (Gaikoku kawase oyobi qaikoku bieki kanrih5) (Law No. 228, 1949, as amended
1964) [hereinafter cited FECA], English translation in 5 Eibun h~reisha Law
Bulletin Series [hereinafter EHS] No. 5010; Cabinet Order Concerning Control of
Foreign Exchange (Gaikoku kawase kanri-rei) (Cabinet Order No. 203, June 1950,
as amended 1964), in 5 EHS No. 5130; Cabinet Order Concerning Export Trade
Control (Yushutsu bieki kanri-rei) (Cabinet Order No. 378, 1949, as amended 1966),
in 5 EHS No. 5060; and Cabinet Order Concerning Controls of Import Trade
(Yunyi boeki kanri-rei) (Cabinet Order No. 414, 1949, as amended 1964), in 5
EHS No. 5090.
"These detailed regulations are explained, in English, in the looseleaf service
INSTITUTE oF FoREIGN EXCHANGE & TRADE REsEARcH, JAPAN FOREIGN EXCHANGE
AND TRADE CoNTROL HANDBOOK pts. D & E (1961).
" Domex Int'l Co. v. Yokohama Tsusho K.K., HANREI JI6 (No. 430) 17 (1966)
(Tokyo Dist. Ct., 6th Civ. Dep't, Aug. 28, 1965). But cf. Okura Shoji K.K. v. Japan,
19 Keishii 9 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Jan. 20, 1965) (conviction, implicitly premised on the
validity of check price system, upheld).
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piracy of foreign designs registered in Japan and to assist quality
inspections to maintain trade association standards. These useful
provisions"m have enhanced the good reputation of Japanese products
abroad.
Finally, the quota problem should be mentioned in connection with
Japanese exports." This device started with cotton textiles and has
spread in recent years to other products, such as synthetic fibers
and flatware. The quotas are creatures of U.S./Japanese agreement
whereby the Japanese have undertaken to limit the total exports of
a given product to the United States. This "voluntary" limitation
of Japanese exports has resulted from the highly competitive nature
of certain Japanese manufactured goods, both in price and quality.
American cotton textile manufacturers in particular have been unable
to cope with Japanese selling prices in the United States. In an
attempt to protect the local manufacturers' position, or at least assist
them over a transition, the United States has extracted quota limita-
tions from Japanese exporters, who have probably agreed only because
they realize that if they compete too successfully, the American manu-
facturers might be successful in raising a tariff against their goods.
National regulations of the United States have also played a role
in adjusting frictions caused by Japanese exports. Sometimes Japan-
ese prices have been low enough to cause American manufacturers
(e.g., steel companies' 7) to invoke the United States anti-dumping
laws,18 although to date such complaints have been difficult to sub-
stantiate. In the future it will be interesting to see whether certain
noncompetitive American manufacturers will be successful in estab-
lishing further countervailing actions such as quotas or amendments
strengthening the anti-dumping laws. 9
Even more than exports, imports have been highly regulated by
Japan in order to permit Japanese industries to become competitive
enough, it would seem, so that imports of manufactured goods would,
in most cases, not occur. Japanese restrictions on imports have taken
the form originally of foreign exchange budgeting of funds available
and licensing of payment controlled under the Foreign Exchange and
" Export Inspection Law (Yushutsu kensah6) (Law No. 97, 1957), in 5 EHS
No. 5595.See HUSBERGER, JAPAN AND THE UNrrED STATES IN WoRLD TRADE 278, 341
(1964).27For a list of other complainant industries see 111 CoNG. REc. 12541 (1965).
Antidumping Act of 1921, §§ 201-12, 42 Stat. 11, as amended, 19 U.S.C. §§ 160-71(1964).
"For proposed amendments see H.R. 8510, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
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Trade Control Act of 1949. In the 1950's, this method of controlling
imports was satisfactory to accomplish a dual purpose: (1) to manage
Japan's scarce foreign exchange balances, and (2) to select the kinds
and quanties of imports to maximize the growth and development of
Japanese industry. 0 Of course, tariff policy was also used on occasion
to discourage imports of certain products, even though such foreign
products might be allocated foreign exchange.
1. International Regulations. This restrictive scheme worked well
until about 1959 when the United States and other members of the
General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT) began to insist
that Japan, a member since September 1955, should liberalize her
trade. Trade liberalization in Japan2 ' had stood at 16% when she
joined GATT in 1955, and it had reached only 22% by April 1959,
in contrast to a 90% liberalization achieved by Western Europe. In
1961, a Cabinet Council for Promoting Liberalization of Foreign
Trade and Exchange was set up to promote foreign trade and foreign
exchange liberalization. By October 1962, 88% liberalization had been
achieved. Then in February 1963 the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) informed Japan that she should no longer impose foreign
exchange restrictions on current payments for balance of payments
reasons. In other words, the IMF recommended an article 8 (rather
than article 14) status for Japan under the IMF agreement.22 Also,
Japan then changed its status in GATT from an article 12 to an article
11 status.23 Under article 11 a nation may not impose restrictions
on imports in order to maintain its balance of payments. In 1964,
Japan became a member of Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD), which also requires, in principle, a max-
imum liberality in foreign trade and investment. So, article 8 status
under IMF, article 11 status under GATT, and membership in OECD
were all international law commitments inconsistent with the restric-
tions of the old Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Act
of 1949, which basically prohibited all transactions involving foreign
exchange with nonresidents, unless such transactions were approved
by officialdom. Hence, the Act was amended effective April 1, 1964.
2. Licensing of Imports. Many foreigners may have felt that the
FECA § 52.Ohara, supra note 2, at 6.
'INTL MONETARY FUND, ARTICLE OF AGREEMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL 'ONE-
TARY FUND (1962) [effective Dec. 27, 1945] ; Ohara, supra note 2, at 7.




April 1964 amendments to the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade
Control Act of 1949, purporting to liberalize Japanese trade, were
illusory. In fact, it is still necessary under the present import system
to obtain an import license from an officially authorized bank to cover
every import into Japan. What the amendment to the law actually
did was restrict imports, in a sense, by requiring a license for the
import transactions itself, while liberalizing foreign exchange pay-
ments needed to perform the sales contract. This change in and of
itself, then, obviously did not liberalize Japanese trade, but simply
required a license to import, instead of a license to pay. Thus, by
formally complying with the requirements of IMF article 8 and GATT
article 11, little concession was made by officialdom in relaxing the
controls and paperwork involved in Japanese imports. However, by
April 1966, on an item basis (rather than evaluation basis), Japanese
imports were liberalized to 93.2%. Japan, however, reserved 120
restricted items, otherwise required to be freed by GATT provisions.
These 120 items included a number of very important manufactured
trade items, whereas of course many of the liberalized items were raw
materials nonexistent in Japan (comprising perhaps 80%) or which
foreigners do not produce at all and which therefore involved no
competition between foreign and domestic makers.
Even the liberalized items, as noted, must still be licensed by one
of the authorized banks under one of two procedures: (1) Under
the "automatic approval system" the importer requests an import
license from a bank which simply processes a license and issues it
after ascertaining that is complies with section 4, paragraph 2, of the
Cabinet Order Concerning Import Trade Controls. (2) The auto-
matic import quota system is used for certain liberalized goods in
order to give the Ministry of International Trade Industry information
about the flow of goods by issuing import quota certificates. The
certificate is automatic, free, and ordinarily promptly issued.
Much as the voluntary "quota system" imposed on textile imports
in the United States has disappointed Japanese producers, the ob-
stacles and irritating paperwork involved in Japanese licensing pro-
cedures have caused problems for certain American manufacturers,
particularly those in the automobile industry where imports are still
restricted and subjected in addition to high tariff rates. Nevertheless,
during a developmental period, Japan intends to protect smaller or
"cottage type" industries in Japan, as well as some new industries,
[ VOL. 42: 333
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from the full blast of international competition.
Several countries, particularly in Europe, have applied discrimina-
tory tactics against Japan, including invoking article 35 of GATT. 4
The United Kingdom, France, and the Benelux countries recently
discontinued their use of GATT article 35, but have allegedly used
other methods of discriminating. Also, Japan apparently feels that
West Germany, Italy, and Sweden discriminate without invoking
GATT article 35, and of course the United States and Canada have
imposed quota restrictions, "voluntarily" accepted by Japanese ex-
porters.
3. Tariffs. At GATT ministerial conferences in 1964 and 1965,
Japan submitted 125 industrial items and 200 agricultural items,
respectively, for exclusion from tariff cuts. 5 These items cover
roughly 9% of total imports. Generally, the most common Japanese
duty is 20% on an ad valorem basis, and the highest rate is 50%, with
a few inconsequential exceptions. The amount of customs duty col-
lected by Japan in 1962 amounted to 20% of the total amount of im-
ports dutiable.
In conclusion then, although on an item basis, Japan is on a 93.2 %
free import basis, there are still substantial restrictions in terms of
procedures and tariffs, even on some liberalized items. Also, many
important competitive items are still placed on a nonliberalized quota
basis requiring a permit to be issued at the discretion of officials.
The foregoing can do no more than suggest the range and kinds of
problems raised by international and national regulatory schemes as
they apply to the dynamic Japanese economy and particularly its
critical external trade.26
0' GATT art XXXV:
1. Without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph 5(b) of Article XXV or to
the obligations of a contracting party pursuant to paragraph I of Article XXIX,
this Agreement, or alternatively Article II of this Agreement, shall not apply
as between any contracting party and any other contracting party if :
(a) The two contracting parties have not entered into tariff negotiations
with each other, and(b) either of the contracting parties, at the time either becomes a contracting
party, does not consent to such application.
2. The CONTRACTING PARTIES may, at any time before the Havana Char-
ter enters into force, review the operation of this Article in particular cases at the
request of any contracting party and make appropriate recommendations.
'See MINisTRY OF FINANCE, CUSTOMS ADMINISTRATION IN JAPAN 1-21 (1963).
" Though the following do not emphasize the legal issues, see generally HOLLER-
MAN, JAPAN'S DEPENDENCE ON THE WORLD ECONOMY (1967) ; HUH, JAPAN'S TRADE
IN AsrA (1966); HUNSBERGER, op. cit. supra note 16.
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